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OPTIMAL SPATIAL PRICING STRATEGIES WITH TRANSPORTATION
COSTS
G. BUTTAZZO AND G. CARLIER
Abstract. We consider an optimization problem in a given region Q where an agent has to decide
the price p(x) of a product for every x ∈ Q. The customers know the pricing pattern p and may
shop at any place y, paying the cost p(y) and additionally a transportation cost c(x, y) for a given
transportation cost function c. We will study two models: the first one where the agent operates
everywhere on Q and a second one where the agent operates only in a subregion. For both models
we discuss the mathematical framework and we obtain an existence result for a pricing strategy
which maximizes the total profit of the agent. We also present some particular cases where more
detailed computations can be made, as the case of concave costs, the case of quadratic cost, and the
onedimensional case. Finally we discuss possible extensions and developments, as for instance the
case of Nash equilibria when more agents operate on the same market.
1. Introduction
In the present paper we consider a model where in a prescribed region Q of the Euclidean space
Rd an agent (a central government or a commercial company) has the possibility to decide the price
of a certain product; this price p(x) may vary at each point x ∈ Q and the customers density f(x)
is assumed to be completely known.
We assume that all the customers buy the same quantity of the product; on the counterpart, a
customer living at the point x ∈ Q knows the pricing function p everywhere and may decide to buy
the product where he lives, then paying a cost p(x), or in another place y, then paying the cost p(y)
and additionally a transportation cost c(x, y) for a given transportation cost function c.
The individual strategy of each customer is then to solve the minimization problem
min
y∈Q
{
c(x, y) + p(y)
}
. (1.1)
Of particular importance to our problem is the (set-valued) map Tp : Q → Q which associates
to every customer living at the point x all the locations where it is optimal to purchase the good.
Given the price pattern p, Tp is then defined by
Tp(x) := argmin y∈Q
{
c(x, y) + p(y)
}
, ∀x ∈ Q. (1.2)
Without any other constraint, due to the fact that the customers have to buy the product (for
instance gasoline, food, a medical product or cigarettes), the pricing strategy for the agent in order to
maximize the total income would simply be increasing everywhere the function p more and more. To
avoid this trivial strategy we assume that on the region Q some kind of regulations are present, and
we study the optimization problems the agent has to solve in order to maximize its total profit. We
will study two models according to two different price constraints. We also assume that the supply
is unconstrained at any location of the region Q, which means that whatever the total demand for
the product is at a given location, it can be supplied by the agent to the customers.
1.1. The agent operates everywhere. The simplest situation we consider is when the price
p(x) is constrained to remain below a fixed bound p0(x) everywhere on Q, due for instance to
some regulatory policy. The only assumption we make is that p0 is a proper nonnegative function,
intending that in the region where p0 = +∞ no restrictions on p(x) are imposed. The goal of the
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2 G. BUTTAZZO AND G. CARLIER
agent is to maximize its total income that, with the notation introduced in (1.1) and (1.2), can be
written as
F (p, T ) :=
∫
Q
p(Tx) df(x) (1.3)
under the constraint (state equation) that Tx ∈ Tp(x) i.e. that T is compatible with the customer’s
individual minimization problem (1.1). One may therefore see the previous program as a nonstandard
optimal control problem where p is the control and T the state variable. Let us mention that problems
with a similar structure naturally arise in the so-called principal-agent problem in Economics (see
for instance Rochet and Chone´ [5] and the references therein).
1.2. The agent operates in a subregion. We consider a second model of pricing strategy: we
suppose that in Q there is a given subregion Q0 where the price p(x) is fixed as a function p0(x) that
the agent cannot control. This is for instance the case of another country if the agent represents a
central government, or of a region where for some social reasons that the agent cannot modify, the
prices of the product are fixed.
Whenever Tp(x) ⊂ Q0, then the agent makes no benefit from customers living at x. In fact the
total profit of the agent is given by
Π(p, T ) :=
∫
T−1(Q\Q0)
p(Tx) df(x). (1.4)
under the constraint (state equation) that Tx ∈ Tp(x). Note that in formula (1.4) giving the total
profit, the integration is now performed only on the set of customers that do shop in the region
controlled by the agent and not in the fixed-price region Q0. The problem we are interested in
reads again as the maximization of the functional Π(p, T ) among the admissible choices of state and
control variables.
For both models above we discuss the mathematical framework which enables us to obtain an
existence result for an optimal pricing strategy and we present some particular cases where more
detailed computations can be made, as the case of concave costs, the case of a quadratic cost, and
the onedimensional case.
The last section contains some discussions about possible extensions and developments, as for
instance the case of Nash equilibria when more agents operate on the same market.
2. Problem formulation in the first case
In what follows, Q will be some compact metric space (the economic region), and p0 : Q→ [0,+∞]
a nonnegative proper function, i.e. we assume that p0 is not +∞ everywhere on Q. We are also
given a transportation cost function c assumed to be continuous and nonnegative on Q×Q and such
that c(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Q. Finally, f is a nonnegative Radon measure on Q that models the
distribution of customers in Q.
The unknown of the problem is the pricing pattern p that varies in the class
A :=
{
p : Q→ R : p ≤ p0 on Q, p l.s.c. on Q
}
.
Once a price p has been chosen by the agent, consumers living at any point x ∈ Q purchase the
good so as to minimize their total expenditure which is given by price plus commuting cost. This
leads to the following definitions:{
vp(x) := miny∈Q
{
c(x, y) + p(y)
}
,
Tp(x) :=
{
y ∈ Q : c(x, y) + p(y) = vp(x)
}
.
(2.1)
By our l.s.c. and compactness assumptions, Tp(x) is a nonempty compact subset of Q (but Tp is
not single-valued in general); moreover the graph of Tp is compact as the argmin of some l.s.c.
function on Q × Q. Note that Tp(x) is the set of locations where consumers living at x rationally
choose to purchase the good. It is possible however that, for some customers, the optimal total cost
vp(x) is reached at more than one point y ∈ Q; in this case we assume the tie-breaking rule that the
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consumers living at x choose to go to a transportation-minimizing (or equivalently price-maximizing)
location y ∈ Tp(x):
y ∈ argmin Tp(x)c(x, ·) = argmax Tp(x)p(·)
(notice that every y ∈ Tp(x) yields the same minimal total expenditure to the customer living at x).
With the previous notation, the optimal pricing problem amounts to
max
{
F (p) : p ∈ A
}
(2.2)
where F is the functional
F (p) =
∫
Q
(
max
y∈Tp(x)
p(y)
)
df(x). (2.3)
By the definition of Tp and vp, one has vp(x) = c(x, y) + p(y) for all y ∈ Tp(x), hence the profit
functional can be rewritten as:
F (p) =
∫
Q
(
vp(x)− min
y∈Tp(x)
c(x, y)
)
df(x).
In order to obtain the existence of a solution to the optimization problem (2.2) we reformulate
the problem by using the variable v = vp instead of p; the advantage is that v is searched among
c-concave functions, while p does not have special properties, and this will enable us to obtain the
extra compactness necessary to prove the existence result.
Definition 2.1. A function v : Q→ R is called c-concave if there exists a function u : Q→ R (that
without loss of generality can be assumed upper semicontinuous) such that
v(x) = inf
{
c(x, y)− u(y) : y ∈ Q}. (2.4)
For every c-concave function v the c-transform vc is defined by
vc(y) = inf
{
c(x, y)− v(x) : x ∈ Q}
and the c-superdifferential ∂cv(x) is given by
∂cv(x) =
{
y ∈ Q : v(x) + vc(y) = c(x, y)}.
The previous definition expresses that c-concave functions are functions that can be written as
pointwise infima of functions of the form x 7→ c(x, y)− u(y) for some u : Q→ R. The analogy with
concave functions (as infima of affine functions) and the parallel between the c-transform and the
more familiar Legendre-Fenchel transform then should be clear to the reader. In a similar way, the
notion of c-superdifferential generalizes the notion of superdifferential for a concave function, and
one can actually characterize c-superdifferentials in terms of the so-called c-cyclical monotonicity
property that is analogous to the usual cyclical monotonicity. Let us remark as a first example that
if c is a distance, then c-concave functions are exactly 1-Lipschitz functions, and in this case one can
take u = −v in (2.4). The case of strictly convex costs, and in particular the quadratic cost, will be
treated in subsection 3.2.
Lemma 2.2. Every c-concave function is uniformly continuous and its continuity modulus is bounded
by the continuity modulus of the cost function c on Q×Q.
Proof. Take a c-concave function v and two points x1, x2 ∈ Q. By the definition of c-concavity, for
a suitable upper semicontinuous function u we have
v(x2) = min
{
c(x2, y)− u(y) : y ∈ Q
}
= c(x2, y2)− u(y2)
where y2 is a suitable point in Q. Then we have
v(x1) ≤ c(x1, y2)− u(y2) = v(x2) + c(x1, y2)− c(x2, y2).
Interchanging the role of x1 and x2 we deduce
|v(x1)− v(x2)| ≤ |c(x1, y2)− c(x2, y2)|
which concludes the proof. 
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Lemma 2.3. If (vn) is a sequence of c-concave functions converging uniformly to v, then v
c
n converge
uniformly to vc and v is c-concave. As a consequence, for every x ∈ Q we have
min
y∈∂cv(x)
c(x, y) ≤ lim inf
n
(
min
y∈∂cvn(x)
c(x, y)
)
.
Proof. Since vcn are c-concave, by Lemma 2.2 it is enough to show that v
c
n converge to v
c pointwise
on Q. Fix y ∈ Q and let xn ∈ Q be such that
vcn(y) = c(xn, y)− vn(xn).
Since Q is compact, a subsequence of (xn) converges to some x ∈ Q, so that
lim inf
n
vcn(y) = c(x, y)− v(x) ≥ vc(y).
Vice versa, if x ∈ Q is such that vc(y) = c(x, y)− v(x), we have vcn(y) ≤ c(x, y)− vn(x), so that
lim sup
n
vcn(y) ≤ c(x, y)− v(x) = vc(y).
The fact that v is c-concave follows in an analogous way.
For the last assertion, fixed x ∈ Q take yn ∈ ∂cvn(x) such that c(x, ·) reaches on ∂cvn(x) its
minimal value c(x, yn). By definition of ∂
cvn we have
vn(x) + v
c
n(yn) = c(x, yn)
and we may assume that yn → y in Q. By the first part of the lemma we may pass to the limit and
deduce that
v(x) + vc(y) = c(x, y)
which gives y ∈ ∂cv(x) and
min
∂cv(x)
c(x, ·) ≤ c(x, y) = lim inf
n
c(x, yn) = lim inf
n
(
min
∂cvn(x)
c(x, ·)
)
as required. 
We reformulate now problem (2.2) by considering the functional
I(v) =
∫
Q
[
v(x)− min
y∈∂cv(x)
c(x, y)
]
df(x) (2.5)
on the admissible class
B =
{
v c-concave, 0 ≤ v(x) ≤ v0(x)
}
where
v0(x) = inf
{
c(x, y) + p0(y) : y ∈ Q
}
.
By Lemma 2.2 the class B is compact for the uniform convergence, and by Lemma 2.3 the optimiza-
tion problem
max
{
I(v) : v ∈ B} (2.6)
admits a solution vopt.
We can now come back to the initial problem (2.2) and deduce that it admits an optimal solution
popt. Indeed, if v ∈ B, then p := −vc ∈ A (since for any function u we have (uc)c ≥ u) and
I(v) = F (p). Moreover, it is easy to check that Tp(x) ⊂ ∂cvp(x) for every p ∈ A. Thus, popt := −vcopt
actually solves (2.2) since for every p ∈ A one has
F (p) ≤
∫
Q
[
vp(x)− min
y∈∂cvp(x)
c(x, y)
]
df(x) = I(vp) ≤ I(vopt) = F (popt).
3. Examples
So far, we have been in a rather abstract framework and it is time now to look at some special
cases where the problem takes a more tractable form.
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3.1. The case cost equal to distance. We consider here the particular case when the cost function
c(x, y) is given by a distance d(x, y) on Q; we shall see that in this situation the solution popt above
can be recovered in an explicit way. We denote by Lip1,d(Q) the class of all Lipschitz functions in
Q for the distance d whose Lipschitz constant does not exceed 1.
Theorem 3.1. In the case c(x, y) = d(x, y) the optimal solution is given by
popt(x) = max
{
p(x) : p ∈ Lip1,d(Q), p ≤ p0
}
.
Proof. We first notice that in this case the class of c-concave functions coincides with the class
Lip1,d(Q). Moreover, as we have seen in the reduction from problem (2.2) to problem (2.6), we may
limit ourselves to consider only functions which are of the form −vc where v is c-concave. In our
case this allows us to limit the class of admissible p to Lip1,d(Q).
Due to the tie-breaking rule it is easy to see that for p ∈ Lip1,d(Q) it is Tp(x) = x, which gives to
the cost functional F the simpler form
F (p) =
∫
Q
p(x) df(x).
Maximizing the previous expression in the class of functions in Lip1,d(Q) which are bounded by p0
provides the solution
popt(x) = max
{
p(x) : p ∈ Lip1,d(Q), p ≤ p0
}
as required. 
Remark 3.2. We notice that in the case c(x, y) = d(x, y) above the optimal pricing pattern popt does
not depend on the distribution f of customers. Note also the explicit formula for the optimal price:
popt(x) = inf{p0(y) + d(x, y) : y ∈ Q} ∀x ∈ Q.
Remark 3.3. When Q is a subset of the Euclidean space RN , then Theorem 3.1 in particular applies
to the concave case where d(x, y) = |x− y|α with α ∈ (0, 1] since such costs are in fact metrics.
3.2. The case of a strictly convex cost. We consider now the case Q := Ω where Ω is some open
bounded subset of the Euclidean space RN and c(x, y) = h(x− y) where h is a nonnegative smooth
and strictly convex function. In this framework, a c-concave function v can be represented as:
v(x) := min{h(x− y)− vc(y), y ∈ Q}, ∀x ∈ Q. (3.1)
By the smoothness of h, the compactness of Q and Lemma 2.2 ensure that v is Lipschitz continuous
on Q hence Lebesgue a.e. differentiable on Ω by Rademacher’s theorem. For every point x ∈ Ω of
differentiability of v and every y ∈ ∂cv(x), it is easy to check that from (3.1) one has:
∇v(x) := ∇h(x− y)
and since h is strictly convex this can be rewritten as:
y = x−∇h∗(∇v(x)) (3.2)
where h∗ stands for the Legendre transform of h. This proves that for every c-concave function v, ∂cv
is in fact single-valued on a set of full Lebesgue measure. Now further assuming that f is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Ω, we can rewrite the profit functional in a
more familiar form:
I(v) =
∫
Ω
[v − h(∇h∗(∇v))] df =
∫
Ω
[v + h∗(∇v)−∇v · ∇h∗(∇v)] df.
If we further restrict our attention to the quadratic case, namely c(x, y) := |x − y|2/2 and Ω is
convex, it is easy to see that v is c-concave on Ω if and only if the function w defined by
w(x) :=
1
2
|x|2 − v(x), ∀x ∈ Ω
is convex and satisfies
∇w(x) ∈ Q for a.e. x ∈ Ω.
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Of course the constraint v ≤ v0 translates into w ≥ w0 with w0(x) := |x|2/2 − v0(x). Putting
everything together, we then see that v solves (2.6) if and only if v(x) = |x|2/2−w(x) and w solves
the following:
inf
w∈C
K(w) where K(w) :=
∫
Ω
[
1
2
|∇w|2 − x · ∇w + w
]
df (3.3)
and
C := {w : Ω→ R, w convex, w ≥ w0, ∇w ∈ Q a.e.}.
Problems of the calculus of variations subject to a convexity constraint with a very similar structure
as (3.3) arise in the monopoly pricing model of Rochet and Chone´ ([5]). Note also that by strict
convexity, (3.3) possesses a unique solution.
3.3. The quadratic case in dimension one. We now consider problem (3.3) in the special uni-
dimensional case where Ω = (0, 1), df = dx and w0 ≡ 0 (which corresponds to the price bound
p0(x) = x − x2/2). The problem amounts to maximize K(w) among convex, nondecreasing and
1-Lipschitz functions w. It is obvious that one necessarily has w(0) = 0 at the optimum, which
setting q := w′ and integrating by parts enables us to write
K(w) =
∫ 1
0
[
1
2
q(x)2 + (1− 2x)q(x)
]
dx
and the previous integral has to be minimized among nondecreasing functions q(x) taking values in
[0, 1]. By a straightforward computation, the infimum is attained for qopt(x) = (2x − 1)+, so that
integrating we find wopt and then by vopt(x) := x
2/2− wopt(x). Summarizing, we have obtained
vopt(x) =
{
x2/2 if x ∈ [0, 1/2]
−x2/2 + x− 1/4 if x ∈ [1/2, 1].
Finally, the optimal price is obtained by the formula popt = −vcopt(x) which simply yields here
popt(x) = x/2− x2/4 = p0(x)/2.
4. Problem formulation in the second case
In what follows, Q will be some compact metric space (the economic region), Q0 is some open
subset of Q (the subregion where prices are fixed) and p0 is a nonnegative l.s.c. function defined on
Q0 (p0 is the fixed price system in Q0). We are also given a transportation cost function c assumed
to be continuous and nonnegative on Q × Q and such that c(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Q. Finally, f is
a nonnegative Radon measure on Q of positive mass that models the repartition of customers in Q.
We set Q1 := Q \ Q0, this (compact) subregion being the one where prices have to be determined
by the agent.
The unknown of the problem is the pricing pattern p in the following class:
A := {p : Q→ R, p = p0 on Q0, p l.s.c. on Q}.
Once a price p has been fixed by the agent, consumers living at x purchase the good so as to minimize
their total expenditure i.e. price plus commuting cost, which leads to define, analogously to what
done in Section 2, {
vp(x) := miny∈Q
{
c(x, y) + p(y)
}
,
Tp(x) :=
{
y ∈ Q : c(x, y) + p(y) = vp(x)
}
.
(4.1)
By our l.s.c. and compactness assumptions Tp(x) is a nonempty compact subset of Q and moreover
the graph of Tp is compact as the argmin of some l.s.c. function on Q ×Q. Note that Tp(x) is the
set of locations where consumers living at x rationally choose to purchase the good. If Tp(x) ⊂ Q0
then all the profit generated by the consumers of x goes to the runner of region Q0. We thus define:{
Ω0(p) :=
{
x ∈ Q : Tp(x) ⊂ Q0
}
,
Ω1(p) :=
{
x ∈ Q : Tp(x) ∩Q1 6= ∅
}
.
(4.2)
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When x ∈ Ω0(p), the agent makes no profit on consumers of x; when x ∈ Ω1(p), we assume as
tie-breaking rule that the consumers living at x go to a transportation-minimizing (or equivalently
to a price-maximizing) location y ∈ Tp(x):
y ∈ argmin Tp(x)∩Q1c(x, ·) = argmax Tp(x)∩Q1p(·)
(notice that every y ∈ Tp(x) yields the same minimal expenditure to x).
With the previous notations, we see that the optimal pricing problem amounts to the maximization
problem
max
{
Π(p) : p ∈ A} (4.3)
where
Π(p) :=
∫
Ω1(p)
(
max
y∈Tp(x)∩Q1
p(y)
)
df(x).
By the definition of Tp and vp, one has vp(x) = c(x, y) + p(y) for all y ∈ Tp(x), hence the profit
functional can be rewritten as:
Π(p) =
∫
Ω1(p)
(
vp(x)− min
y∈Tp(x)∩Q1
c(x, y)
)
df(x).
Defining for all x ∈ Ω1(p) {
Hp(x) := maxy∈Tp(x)∩Q1 p(y),
Gp(x) := miny∈Tp(x)∩Q1 c(x, y)
we may then rewrite in a more synthetical way the profit as
Π(p) =
∫
Ω1(p)
Hp(x) df(x) =
∫
Ω1(p)
(vp(x)−Gp(x)) df(x).
Remark 4.1. So far, we have not assumed that p has to be nonnegative, in fact this constraint is
unnecessary since it will directly follow from the maximization problem (4.3). Indeed if p ∈ A then
p+ := max(p, 0) is also in A and Π(p+) ≥ Π(p). If Hp ≤ 0 on Ω1(p), this claim is obvious. We may
then assume that {Hp ≥ 0}∩Ω1(p) 6= ∅. Let x ∈ Ω1(p) be such that Hp(x) ≥ 0 and let y ∈ Tp(x)∩Q1
be such that Hp(x) = p(y) = p+(y); we have vp(x) = c(x, y) + p(y) = c(x, y) + p+(y) ≥ vp+(x) and
since vp ≤ vp+ this yields vp+(x) = c(x, y) + p+(y) which implies x ∈ Ω1(p+), y ∈ Tp+(x) and
Hp+(x) ≥ Hp(x). We then have
Π(p) ≤
∫
Ω1(p)∩{Hp≥0}
Hp(x) df(x) ≤
∫
Ω1(p+)
Hp+(x) df(x) = Π(p+).
5. The existence result
5.1. Generalized concavity. To prove the existence of a maximizer in (4.3), we reformulate the
problem in terms of vp rather than on the price p which a priori does not have special properties. To
do that, it is convenient to use some notions of generalized concavity that are natural in our context
(as well as in the Monge-Kantorovich theory). Before introducing formal definitions let us remark
that for p ∈ A, one can rewrite vp (defined by (4.1)) as:
vp(x) = v0(x) ∧ wp(x)
(where a ∧ b denotes the minimum of the two real numbers a and b) with{
v0(x) := infy∈Q0
{
c(x, y) + p0(y)
}
,
wp(x) := infy∈Q1
{
c(x, y) + p(y)
}
.
(5.1)
From the previous formula we see that wp can be represented as the pointwise infimum of a family
of functions x 7→ c(x, y) + p(y) where the parameter y takes its values in Q1. This suggests the
following definition.
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Definition 5.1. A function w : Q→ R is called (Q1, c)-concave if there exists a function u : Q1 → R
bounded from above such that
w(x) = inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− u(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q. (5.2)
If w is (Q1, c)-concave there exists a kind of minimal representation (as for the usual Legendre-
Fenchel transform) of w in the form (5.2). Indeed, using the c-transform (see Definition 2.1)
wc(y) := inf
x∈Q
{c(x, y)− w(x)} ∀y ∈ Q1,
one has
w(x) = inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− wc(y)} ∀x ∈ Q. (5.3)
Indeed, on the one hand, the definition of wc yields w(x) +wc(y) ≤ c(x, y) for every (x, y) ∈ Q×Q1,
hence:
w(x) ≤ inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− wc(y)}.
On the other hand, using the representation (5.2) yields u ≤ wc on Q1 hence
w(x) = inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− u(y)} ≥ inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− wc(y)}.
Analogously to what was done in Section 2, for every (Q1, c)-concave function w, the (Q1, c)-
superdifferential of w at x ∈ Q (denoted ∂1,cw(x)) is defined by
∂1,cw(x) := {y ∈ Q1 : w(x) + wc(y) = c(x, y)}.
Since Q and Q1 are compact and (Q1, c)-concave functions and their c-transforms are continuous,
it is easy to see that for every (Q1, c)-concave function w and every x ∈ Q, ∂1,cw(x) is a nonempty
compact subset of Q1 and that {(x, y) ∈ Q×Q1 : y ∈ ∂1,cw(x)} is compact.
5.2. Reformulation. The aim of this subsection is to reformulate the maximization problem (4.3)
in terms of w = wp only. Let p ∈ A be nonnegative (which is not restrictive in view of Remark 4.1)
and write
vp := v0 ∧ w
with w = wp and v0 defined by (5.1). Then, let us define
u˜(y) := inf
x∈Q
{c(x, y)− w(x)} ∀y ∈ Q1; (5.4)
as already noticed, since w = wp is (Q1, c)-concave we have
w(x) := inf
y∈Q1
{c(x, y)− u˜(y)} ∀x ∈ Q.
Now let us define
p˜(y) :=
{
p0(y) if y ∈ Q0
−u˜(y) if y ∈ Q1.
By construction wp˜ = wp hence vp˜ = vp. The next proposition expresses that the profit is improved
when one replaces p by p˜. This allows us to restrict the analysis to prices that are (up to a minus
sign) a c-transform on the free region Q1 and will enable us to express the problem in terms of w
only. More precisely, we have the following.
Proposition 5.2. Let p ∈ A, p ≥ 0 and let p˜ and w be defined as above. Then one has
vp˜ = vp, p˜ ≤ p on Q1, p˜ ≥ 0 on Q, (5.5)
Tp(x) ∩Q1 ⊂ Tp˜(x) ∩Q1, ∀x ∈ Ω1(p), (5.6)
Ω1(p) ⊂ Ω1(p˜) = {w ≤ v0}, (5.7)
Tp˜(x) ∩Q1 = ∂1,cw(x), ∀x ∈ Ω1(p˜), (5.8)
which imply
Π(p˜) ≥ Π(p) (5.9)
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and
Π(p˜) =
∫
{w≤v0}
(
w(x)− min
y∈∂1,cw(x)
c(x, y)
)
df(x). (5.10)
Proof. We already know that vp˜ = vp. Using Subsection 5.1 we know that u := −p ≤ u˜ = −p˜ on
Q1. Since p ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0 we have
u˜(y) = inf
x∈Q
{c(x, y)− w(x)} ≤ inf
x∈Q
{c(x, y)} = 0
which proves p˜ ≥ 0 and (5.5).
Now, fix x ∈ Ω1(p) and y ∈ Tp(x) ∩Q1; then vp(x) = vp˜(x) = c(x, y) + p(y) ≥ w(x) which, since
p(y) ≥ p˜(y), implies that
w(x) = vp(x) ≥ c(x, y) + p˜(y) ≥ vp˜(x)
so that y ∈ Tp˜(x) which proves (5.6). The previous argument also proves that Ω1(p) ⊂ Ω1(p˜). The
fact that Ω1(p˜) = {w ≤ v0} and (5.8) are obvious. Thanks to the fact that p˜ ≥ 0, the integrand in
Π(p˜) is nonnegative and thanks to (5.6) we obtain Gp˜ ≤ Gp on Ω1(p). By (5.7) we then have:
Π(p˜) ≥
∫
Ω1(p)
(vp˜ −Gp˜)df ≥
∫
Ω1(p)
(vp −Gp)df = Π(p).
Finally, thanks to (5.7) and (5.8), Π(p˜) can be rewritten as a function of w only as in (5.10). 
Proposition 5.2 thus enables us to reformulate the initial problem (4.3) as:
sup
w∈W
J(w) =
∫
{w≤v0}
(
w(x)− min
y∈∂1,cw(x)
c(x, y)
)
df(x) (5.11)
where W is the set of all (Q1, c)-concave functions. More precisely, if w solves (5.11) then p˜ defined
by
p˜(y) :=
{
p0(y) if y ∈ Q0
−u˜(y) if y ∈ Q1.
solves (4.3).
Notice that if w ∈W then one has for every (x1, x2) ∈ Q×Q
|w(x1)− w(x2)| ≤ max
y∈Q1
|c(x1, y)− c(x2, y)|, (5.12)
which proves that W is an equicontinuous family.
5.3. Existence. With the reformulation (5.11) (and the equicontinuity estimate (5.12)) at hand,
we easily deduce the following existence result.
Theorem 5.3. Problem (5.11) admits at least one solution (hence so does problem (4.3)).
Proof. Let (wn)n be some maximizing sequence of (5.11); without loss of generality we may assume
that the integrand in the definition of J(wn) is nonnegative (see Remark 4.1) and that minQ(wn −
v0) ≤ 0. By (5.12) we deduce that (wn) is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous. Thanks to
Ascoli-Arzela’s theorem, passing to a subsequence if necessary we may assume that wn converges
uniformly to some w which is easily seen to be (Q1, c)-concave too. To prove that w solves (5.11),
we first use Fatou’s lemma:
lim supJ(wn) ≤
∫
Q
lim supχ{wn≤v0}
(
wn(x)− min
y∈∂1,cwn(x)
c(x, y)
)
df(x).
It is therefore enough to prove that for every x ∈ Q
lim supχ{wn≤v0}(wn(x)−miny∈∂1,cwn(x) c(x, y))
≤ χ{w≤v0}(w(x)−miny∈∂1,cw(x) c(x, y)).
(5.13)
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If w(x) > v0(x) the right-hand side vanishes and, since wn → w uniformly, we have wn(x) > v0(x)
for n large enough, so that the left-hand side vanishes too. Assume now that w(x) ≤ v0(x), and let
yn ∈ ∂1,cwn(x) be such that
c(x, yn) = min
y∈∂1,cwn(x)
c(x, y);
passing to a subsequence if necessary we may assume that yn converges to some y ∈ ∂1,cw(x), hence
(5.13) holds. 
6. Examples
6.1. The eikonal case. In this subsection, we investigate the particular case where Q = Ω, the
closure of a bounded open convex subset of Rd and the cost is the euclidean distance c(x, y) = |x−y|.
As before we assume that Q0 is an open subset of Q and Q1 = Q \Q0. As already noticed, in this
case, the c-concave functions are simply the 1-Lipschitz ones. As for the (Q1, c)-concave ones, it is
easy to see that w is (Q1, c)-concave if and only if it is 1-Lipschitz on Q and
w(x) = min
y∈Q1
{|x− y|+ w(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q. (6.1)
Now, let x ∈ Q0 be a point of differentiability of w and let y ∈ Q1 (so that x 6= y) be such that
w(x) = |x− y|+ w(y) (i.e. y ∈ ∂1,cw(x)), then one has
∇w(x) = x− y|x− y| and there exists λ > 0 such that x− λ∇w(x) ∈ Q1 (6.2)
so that
|∇w(x)| = 1 and ∇w(x) ∈ R+(x−Q1). (6.3)
By Rademacher’s Theorem, (6.3) holds a.e. on Q0. In particular w is an a.e. solution of the eikonal
equation |∇w| = 1 on Q0. Let x ∈ Q0 be a point of differentiability of w, y ∈ ∂1,cw(x) and λ = |x−y|,
then with the fact that w is 1-Lipschitz, it is easy to check that w(x)−w(x− t∇w(x)) = t, for every
t ∈ [0, λ] (i.e. w grows at the maximal rate 1 on the segment [x−λ∇w(x), x]). In particular, choosing
t ∈ [0, λ] such that x− t∇w(x) ∈ ∂Q0 yields:
w(x) ≥ min
y∈∂Q0
{|x− y|+ w(y)}.
By density, this inequality actually holds for all x ∈ Q0, and the converse inequality follows imme-
diately from (6.1).We thus have proved that if w is (Q1, c)-concave then
w(x) = min
y∈∂Q0
{|x− y|+ w(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q0. (6.4)
It is well-known (see [1]) that (6.4) implies that w is a viscosity solution of the eikonal equation
on Q0. Now, conversely, assume that w is 1-Lipschitz on Q and a viscosity solution of the eikonal
equation on Q0 and define
u(x) = min
y∈Q1
{|x− y|+ w(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q. (6.5)
then u = w on Q1 (in particular on ∂Q0) and by the same argument as above u is a viscosity solution
of the eikonal equation on Q0. A standard comparison argument (e.g. Theorem 2.7 in [1]) yields
u = w on Q0 so that w is (Q1, c)-concave. This proves that the set of (Q1, c) concave functions is:
W = {w : Q→ R, w 1-Lipschitz on Q and |∇w| = 1 on Q0} (6.6)
where the eikonal equation has to be understood in the viscosity sense. Let us also remark that the
condition ∇w(x) ∈ R+(x −Q1) a.e. in Q0 is in fact hidden in the definition of a viscosity solution
(equivalently in formula (6.4)).
Getting back to our optimization problem (5.11), it is natural to introduce for every x ∈ Q and
ν ∈ Sd−1 (the unit sphere of Rd) the quantity:
λ(x, ν) := inf{λ ≥ 0 : x− λν ∈ Q1}. (6.7)
OPTIMAL SPATIAL PRICING STRATEGIES WITH TRANSPORTATION COSTS 11
For w ∈W, we then have for a.e. x ∈ Q
min
y∈∂1,cw(x)
|x− y| = λ(x,∇w(x))
Assuming that f is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Ω and defining
v0 by (5.1), for w ∈W, the profit functional J is then given by:
J(w) :=
∫
{w≤v0}
(
w(x)− λ(x,∇w(x))
)
df(x)
which has to be maximized over W defined by (6.6). Now, our aim is to transform the previous
problem in terms of the values of w on ∂Q0 only. Of course, because of (6.4), the behavior of w
on Q0 is fully determined by its trace on ∂Q0. In order to treat the behavior on Q1, we need the
following result.
Lemma 6.1. Let w ∈W and define
u(x) := min
y∈Q1
{|x− y|+ u(y) ∧ v0(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q,
then u ∈W and J(u) ≥ J(w).
Proof. Obviously u ∈ W and u = u ∧ v0 on Q1 hence the integrand in the definition of J is larger
on Q1 for u than for w (recall that v0 ≥ 0). If x ∈ Q0 is such that w(x) > v0(x), then the same
conclusion holds. Now, if x ∈ Q0 is such that w(x) ≤ v0(x), then we write u(x) = u(y) + |x − y|
with y ∈ ∂1,cu(x), if w(y) ≤ v0(y) then u(x) = w(y) + |x − y| ≥ w(x) and if w(y) ≥ v0(y) then
u(x) = v0(y) + |x− y| ≥ v0(x) ≥ w(x). Since u ≤ w, in both cases we then have u(x) = w(x) which
proves that Q0 ∩ {w ≤ v0} ⊂ Q0 ∩ {u = w}. In particular, u − λ(x,∇u) = w − λ(x,∇w) a.e. on
Q0 ∩ {w ≤ v0} which proves the desired result. 
Let w ∈ W and let φ be the trace of w on ∂Q0, thanks to the previous Lemma we may assume
that w ≤ v0 on Q1 so that:
J(w) =
∫
Q1
w df +
∫
Q0∩{w≤v0}
(
w(x)− λ(x,∇w(x))
)
df(x).
Because of (6.4), the second term only depends on φ, and the first one is monotone in w hence for a
given φ (1-Lipschitz and smaller than v0) it is maximized by the largest 1-Lipschitz function on Q1
which has φ as trace on Q0 and is below v0 i.e. simply
w(x) = min
y∈∂Q0
{|x− y|+ φ(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q1.
Since the previous formula also holds for x ∈ Q0 by (6.4), we define for every 1-Lipschitz function φ
on ∂Q0 such that φ ≤ v0 the state equation
wφ(x) := min
y∈∂Q0
{|x− y|+ φ(y)}, ∀x ∈ Q. (6.8)
The profit maximization (5.11) can thus be reformulated as the following nonstandard optimal
control problem where the control is the price φ on the interface ∂Q0:
sup
φ∈Φ
J(wφ) =
∫
Q1
wφ df +
∫
Q0∩{wφ≤v0}
(
wφ(x)− λ(x,∇wφ(x))
)
df(x) (6.9)
where the class of admissible boundary controls Φ consists of all 1-Lipschitz functions φ on ∂Q0 such
that φ ≤ v0 and the state equation is (6.8).
For example if Q is the unit ball of Rd and Q1 its boundary, then the maximization problem (5.11)
becomes maximizing:
J(w) :=
∫
{w≤v0}
(
w(x)− x · ∇w(x)−
√
(x · ∇w(x))2 + |x|2 − 1
)
df(x)
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in the set of viscosity solutions of the eikonal equation |∇w| = 1 on the unit ball. Note that this
is a highly nonconvex variational problem, which as previously may be reformulated as maximizing
J(wφ) among 1-Lipschitz functions φ on ∂Q0 such that φ ≤ v0.
6.2. The one-dimensional case. In the one dimensional case, the eikonal equation has a very
simple structure which makes problem (6.9) much simpler. In particular, if ∂Q0 is finite then the
maximization of (6.9) reduces to a finite dimensional problem, since the control in this case is simply
given by the values of w on the finite set ∂Q0. For instance let us take Q = [0, 1], Q0 = (α, β)
with 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1. For simplicity let us also assume that p0 is constant on Q0 and that f is a
probability that does not charge points. Then the solutions of (6.9) only depend on the two scalars
p1 := w(α) and p2 := w(β) subject to the constraints:
p1 ≤ p0, p2 ≤ p0, |p2 − p1| ≤ β − α. (6.10)
For such a control (p1, p2) the function w(p1,p2) has the following W-like shape:
Shape of w and v_0
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The function λ(x, ν) is in this case
λ(x, ν) =
 x− α if x ∈]α, β[ and ν = 1,β − x if x ∈]α, β[ and ν = −1,
0 otherwise,
and the corresponding profit can be explicitly computed as a function of (p1, p2):∫ α
0
(p1 + α− s) df(s) +
∫ (s0∧s1)(p1,p2)
α
p1 df(s)
+
∫ β
(s0∨s2)(p1,p2)
p2 df(s) +
∫ 1
β
(p2 + s− β) df(s)
where 
s1(p1, p2) = p0 − p1 + α,
s2(p1, p2) = p2 − p0 + β,
s0(p1, p2) =
1
2(p2 − p1 + β + α).
Defining F the cumulative function of f (i.e. F (t) = f([0, t])), solving (6.9) then amounts to
maximize:
p1F ((s0 ∧ s1)(p1, p2)) + p2
(
1− F ((s0 ∨ s2)(p1, p2))
)
subject to the constraints (6.10). For example, if α = 0, β = 1 (i.e. the price p(x) has to be chosen
only at the boundary of Q) and f is uniform, then there is a unique optimal strategy given by
p1 = p2 =
p0
2 ∨ (p0 − 12).
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7. Concluding remarks and related problems
In this section we propose some further developments of the optimization problems above that
could be investigated. It is not our goal to enter into the details, which could possibly be treated in
a future paper.
The model problems considered in the previous sections could also be used to describe a two (or
more) players game, where each player operates only on its own region and considers the prices on
the other regions as fixed. More precisely, assume that Q = A∪B where A and B are two compact
sets with no interior point in common (although this is not essential for what follows). On A and
B two agents (for instance the central governments of two different countries) operate and initially
two price functions p0(x) and q0(x) are present on A and B respectively.
At a first step the agent that operates on A modifies its price on A considering q0 fixed on B and
maximizes its income choosing an optimal price function p1; then the agent that operates on B plays
its move considering p1 fixed on A and maximizing its income through the choice of an optimal price
function q1. The game continues in this way then providing price functions pn and qn defined on A
and B respectively.
An interesting issue would be the study of the convergence of the sequences (pn) and (qn) to price
strategies p and q that the two agents do not have the interest to modify any more.
A related alternative is to consider the competitive problem between the agents operating on A
and B as a two-persons game (see for instance [2] or [4]), which is not zero-sum, where the strategy
of each player is the pricing function on the region he controls. One has to be cautious in precisely
defining the payoff functions when some customers are indifferent between being the good in A or
in B. In such a case, one can for instance impose, as tie-breaking rule, that each customer shops in
his own region, and for simplicity we assume f(A ∩B) = 0.
For respective price strategies p (prices on A) and q (prices on B), define for all x ∈ Q
vp(x) := inf
y∈A
{c(x, y) + p(y)},
wq(x) := inf
z∈B
{c(x, z) + q(z)},
Tp(x) := {y ∈ A : vp(x) = c(x, y) + p(y)},
Sq(x) := {z ∈ B : wq(x) = c(x, z) + q(z)}.
Under our tie-breaking rule, the payoff functions for the two players are then given by
ΠA(p, q) :=
∫
{vp<wq}
(
max
y∈Tp(x)
p(y)
)
df(x) +
∫
{vp=wq}∩A
(
max
y∈Tp(x)
p(y)
)
df(x)
ΠB(p, q) :=
∫
{wq<vp}
(
max
z∈Sq(x)
q(z)
)
df(x) +
∫
{vp=wq}∩B
(
max
z∈Sq(x)
q(z)
)
df(x).
Defining admissible strategies as pairs of nonnegative and l.s.c. functions on A and B (possibly also
satisfying additional constraints), an interesting issue is then to find Nash equilibria (see for instance
[2] or [4]) for the payoffs (ΠA,ΠB), that is a pair of admissible strategies p
∗ and q∗ such that
ΠA(p
∗, q∗) ≥ ΠA(p, q∗), ΠB(p∗, q∗) ≥ ΠB(p∗, q), ∀ admissible strategies p and q.
This is a priori a complicated problem because Kakutani’s fixed-point Theorem does not apply here
because of the tie-breaking rule which induces discontinuities. Of course, one can extend the frame-
work to more than two-players, introduce mixed-strategies... The analysis of spatial competition
is an important issue in economics since Hotelling’s celebrated model [3] and one may relate the
equilibrium problem described above to this line of research. The study of the general Nash problem
is left for future research, but we give an elementary example where the solution is very simple and
intuitive.
Example 7.1. Let Q = [0, 1], A = [0, 1/2], B = [1/2, 1], α ∈ (0, 1) and c(x, y) = |x− y|. As explained
in Section 6.1, given the strategy of the second (respectively first) player, the first (resp. second)
one optimally choses a pricing function of the form a+ 1/2− x (resp. b+ x− 1/2) for x ∈ A (resp.
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for x ∈ B). At a Nash equilibrium one must have a = b (if a > b then A makes zero profit as well
as B makes zero profit if a < b). Finally, the common value a = b has to be 0, since if for instance
a > 0 then B can charge a slightly lower price a− ε at the border point 1/2 then getting the whole
demand and increasing his profit for ε small enough. In this simple case there is then a unique Nash
equilibrium p(x) = 1/2− x and q(x) = x− 1/2, no matter what the population distribution is. The
equilibrium price is plotted in the next figure.
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